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“Solidarity at the Time of the Fall:” 
Adorno and Rorty on Moral Realism 
Alexander Fischer and Marko J. Fuchs 
Einer fragte Herrn K., ob es einen Gott gäbe. 
Herr K. sagte: “Ich rate dir, nachzudenken, ob dein Verhalten 
je nach der Antwort auf diese Frage sich ändern würde. 
Würde es sich nicht ändern, dann können wir die Frage fallenlassen.” 
(Bertolt Brecht. Geschichten von Herrn Keuner) 
1. Introduction
Current discourse in practical philosophy has seen so-called moral 
realism re-emerge as a controversial topic. Moral realism is here defined 
as positing the existence of eternal and universal moral values, inde-
pendent of the discretion of a moral agent. This has not always been a 
controversial topic. In particular, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy 
aimed to put an end to the thesis of the existence of timeless values in 
favor of the increased life of the individual, and to establish a relativistic 
vitalism instead of a moral realism. Today, however, we see attempts to 
defend moral realism against this Nietzschean attack, but these attempts 
are not without their own fierce criticism.  
One of the most prominent representatives of today’s criticism of re-
alist positions within Ethics is Richard Rorty, who in many ways draws 
on Nietzsche’s philosophy. One of his much-discussed, and also criti-
cized, general theses is the following: instead of eternal and universal 
values it is solidarity with members of one’s own ethnic group that 
should serve as guide for what is to be understood as good behavior. 
Thus conventions supersede universal moral values, and respectively 
concrete conventions in one’s lived life are, through Rorty’s approach, to 
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be saved from the hubris of a metaphysical grounding of morality, 
which shifts the scale of moral action into an afterlife. 
This paper will not make another attempt to defend moral realism 
against Rorty’s critique. It rather confronts Rorty’s position with argu-
ments by Theodor W. Adorno, noting that Adorno also follows the Nie-
tzschean critical attitude towards the assertion of eternal and universal 
values. In this regard, Rorty and Adorno are connected via similar start-
ing points. By turning these two philosophers against one another, how-
ever, it not only becomes clear how diverse relativistic moral critiques 
can be; we also gain interesting insights into Rorty’s critical design, 
which, in turn, also enables a new understanding of Adorno’s critique. 
Adorno also refers to the actual present life world as a reference point 
for moral action. However, for him this reality is not unquestionable and 
also not our ultimate reference for choosing an action, such as it seems 
to be for Rorty. Adorno rather scrutinizes this reality and its norms of 
actions. 
The purpose of this paper now is to demonstrate that Adorno fun-
damentally confronts Rorty’s position. Rorty’s criticism of moral realism 
does not reach far enough and itself ends up at a rather naive moral real-
ism, in which the ethnic group functions as the ultimate measure of 
moral judgment, thus without any possibility to criticize this premise 
itself. By contrast Adorno offers a figure of thought by which even with-
out the assumption of a moral realism in the traditional sense, such a 
criticism is entirely possible. At the end this paper will finally suggest 
that Adorno’s philosophy could be described as a kind of enlightened 
moral realism. 
In order to achieve these goals the paper first depicts Rorty’s posi-
tion. This is followed by the reconstruction of Adorno’s philosophy and a 
comparison of the two positions, which will show how Rorty’s stand-
point cannot withstand Adorno’s critique.  
 
 
2. Rorty: Solidarity rather than Objectivity  
 
The idea of moral realism arises from the context of a philosophy 
that must be understood as a fundamental science, the science of the 
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general, unchangeable and necessary, by means of abstraction. Rorty set 
himself the goal to bid farewell to this idea of philosophy, in order to 
lead the discipline out of its – as stated by Nietzsche – “loss of reality.” 
Instead, a “postmetaphysical culture” (Rorty 1989, xvi) became an objec-
tive in working against the separation of philosophy from life’s reality, 
which bids farewell to the assumption of “permanent truths of reason 
and temporary truths of fact” (Rorty 1991 I, 176). The fundamental accu-
sation of a “life-distance” can also be applied to the requirements of a 
metaphysico-objective morality, which is demanded within the argu-
mentative frame of moral realism and suggests an attitude of escape 
from the contingencies of life. Showing that this is impossible became 
one of the main focuses of Rorty’s philosophy, who, following philoso-
phers like the already mentioned Nietzsche, William James, and John 
Dewey, tried to introduce a pragmatic turn to philosophy, with which 
philosophy and life praxis could close ranks. Thus Rorty argues for the 
disavowal of the “belief that there are, out there in the world, real es-
sences which it is our duty to discover and which are disposed to assist 
in their own discovery” (Rorty 1989, 75). With this in mind, it is point-
less to seek for the essence of anything, including morality, if only be-
cause our reality constantly alters, and because of this an essence (if 
such a thing even existed) would be subject to constant change, too. Pla-
to’s distinct different spheres are no longer available with Rorty, nor is 
the idea of a morality as the morality.  
But in order to approach the phenomenon that we call “morality” 
(escaping our vocabulary is only conditionally possible) we have to – in a 
pragmatic sense – focus on social practices, because “there is nothing 
deep down inside us except what we have to put there ourselves, no cri-
terion that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no 
standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigor-
ous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions” (Rorty 
1982, xlii).  
Thus it is necessary to lift the veil of our commonly used terms and 
to become aware of social practice as a constitutive variable. The same 
applies to morality. Morality can be understood as a result of social prac-
tice, which implies a constant and always contextually embedded 
change:  
Alexander Fischer and Marko J. Fuchs 
 
54 
If we are inclined to philosophize, we shall want the vocabulary offered 
by Dewey, Heidegger, Davidson, and Derrida, with its built-in cautions 
against metaphysics, rather than that offered by Descartes, Hume, and 
Kant. For if we use the former vocabulary, we shall be able to see moral 
progress as a history of making rather than finding, of poetic achieve-
ment by “radically situated” individuals and communities, rather than 
as the gradual unveiling, through the use of “reason,” of “principles” or 
“rights” or “value” (Rorty 1991 I, 188-189). 
 
Although Rorty obviously polemicizes against metaphysical princi-
ples of philosophy, he also adheres to a principle, which can be associat-
ed directly in the sphere of morality: solidarity. This term can serve as an 
example of how Rorty’s understanding of a moral principle in a specific 
context of life is supposed to work. Rorty’s view of solidarity is an alter-
native to an understanding of solidarity that is dependent on objectivity 
(which traditionally depends on the belief of the Humane), as the so-
called realists construct it. Rorty claims that such realists necessarily 
demand implausible additional assumptions, as they  
 
have to construe truth as correspondence to reality. So they must 
construct a metaphysics which has room for a special relation be-
tween beliefs and objects which will differentiate true from false be-
liefs. They also must argue that there are procedures of justification 
of belief which are natural and not merely local. So they must con-
struct an epistemology which has room for a kind of justification 
which is not merely social but natural, springing from human nature 
itself, and made possible by a link between that part of nature and the 
rest of nature (Rorty 1991 II, 22). 
 
According to Rorty these necessary assumptions cannot be designed 
convincingly. He therefore considers it preferable to focus on the con-
crete life context to illustrate solidarity. This depends on identification-
categories with which we calculate the proximity of a person to us, in or-
der to develop a sense of solidarity. Even though this is a psychological 
(and intuitive) and not a systematic argument, Rorty applies it against 
the notion of universal moral principles. Specifically, he applies his ar-
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gumentation against humanism: identification with the humane is not 
enough to motivate solidarity, claiming that “‘because she is a human 
being’ is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action” (Rorty 
1989, 191). A thus-constructed ethical universalism therefore ignores the 
fact that we feel closer to people, with whom “imaginative identification 
is easier” (Rorty 1989, 191). 
Of course, Rorty is aware of the fact that such thinking does not 
come without presuppositions, but rather depends on an age-old ethical 
discourse that recognizes human solidarity as a value. It hence becomes 
clear that Rorty cannot get away from a specific vocabulary, which is the 
product of an indubitable ethnocentrism (Rorty 1991 II, 23, 29). Rorty 
here agrees with Putnam (a well-known colleague in the criticism of 
moral realism), that we can only obtain a better view of morality whilst 
speaking of a tradition (with its echoes of the Bible, philosophy, demo-
cratic revolutions and so on), instead of proclaiming a supposedly ahis-
torical position, as moral realists do. This leaves us with a simple formu-
la for the definitions of our moral values: those beliefs are “true […] 
which he or she finds good to believe” (Rorty 1991 II, 24) – and this cost-
benefit calculation is always embedded in different contexts of history, 
life circumstances etc. A realist will tend to interpret this type of view as 
another positive theory about the nature of truth, that is, as a theory ac-
cording to which the truth is only a respective opinion of an individual 
or a group. “But the pragmatist,” Rorty says, “does not have a theory of 
truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan of solidarity, his account 
of the value of cooperative human inquiry has only an ethical base, not 
an epistemological or metaphysical one. Not having any epistemology, a 
forteriori he does not have a relativistic one” (Rorty 1991 II, 24). 
The accusation of being a relativist can thus be read as a projection of 
the realists, “for the realist thinks that the whole point of philosophical 
thought is to detach oneself from any particular community and look 
down at it from a more universal standpoint” (Rorty 1991 II, 30), but 
those who think they can see axioms are just victims of a “Cartesian fal-
lacy of seeing axioms where there are only shared habits, of viewing 
statements which summarize such practices as if they reported con-
straints enforcing such practices” (Rorty 1991 II, 26). 
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Ultimately Rorty’s critique of metaphysics culminates in an argu-
ment promulgated by Nietzsche, who demands we renounce the meta-
physical ghost constructions and dive into the “real:” 
 
[the] traditional Western metaphysico-epistemological way of firming 
up our habits simply isn’t working anymore. It isn’t doing its job. It 
has become as transparent a device as the postulation of deities who 
turn out, by a happy coincidence, to have chosen us as their people. 
So the pragmatist suggestion that we substitute a ‘merely’ ethical 
foundation for our sense of community – or, better, that we think of 
our sense of community as having no foundation except shared hope 
and the trust created by such sharing – is put forward on practical 
grounds (Rorty 1991 II, 33). 
 
 
3. “Solidarity at the Time of the Fall:”1 Metaphysics and Ethics in Adorno 
 
Rorty’s accomplished anti-metaphysical and pragmatist turn in favor 
of an emphasis on solidarity can, on the one hand, be seen as a demand 
to free actually lived morality from the claims of moral realism, which 
urges people to follow the supposedly morally higher sphere of timeless 
values instead, a sphere separated from actual life. On the other hand, 
the difficulties of such a conception are particularly evident when one’s 
own ethnocentric standpoint becomes a subject of critical assessment, 
because Rorty cannot provide any sort of standard against which his the-
ory can be proven. However, as noted earlier in the introduction, this 
section of the paper is not supposed to go further into the development 
of a transcendental argumentation, but instead wants to ask: Does Ror-
ty’s supposedly enlightened critical attitude, with which he rejects moral 
realism in favor of the fullness of lived morality, go far enough to de-
serve the name of profound criticism? Or is Rorty’s pragmatism to be 
characterized as mere opportunism, compared to a standard of criticism 
that will be introduced in the following? 
                                                 
1 Adorno 1992, 408: “There is solidarity between such [i.e. negative dialectical] thinking 
and metaphysics at the time of its fall.” 
“Solidarity at the Time of the Fall” 
 
57 
The figure of thought that will be consulted for this exam is Adorno’s 
critique of society. Like Rorty within his concept of pragmatism, Adorno 
refuses to use metaphysical arguments for the discussion of the ques-
tion of the successful life. If moral realism is to be understood as a con-
cept that postulates or tries to prove the existence of timeless values that, 
in the end, tell us what we should do, and prove the quality of moral 
goodness or define moral obligations, then Adorno is no more a realist 
than Rorty is. However, the motive that leads Adorno to such a decline is 
slightly different to Rorty’s – in general, it can be named “Auschwitz.” 
For Adorno, Auschwitz is the bankruptcy of any metaphysics that ei-
ther tries to transcend the finite world altogether or claims to deduce 
some meaning of finite being from a transcendental world. “After 
Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as 
sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; they balk at squeezing any kind 
of sense, however bleached, out of the victim’s fate” (Adorno 1992, 361). 
This metaphysical thesis of the significance of finite being implicitly 
sanctions the horrors of the concentrations camps, instead of making it 
explicit and thus become an ally to fascism. However, the absurdness 
that Auschwitz has brought to light is the radical nullity of individuals 
that suffer a mechanized and industrialized death in the gas chambers:  
 
The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had 
never yet to fear in just this fashion. There is no chance any more for 
death to come into the individual’s empirical life as somehow con-
formable with the course of that life. The last, the poorest possession 
left to the individual is expropriated. That in the concentration camps 
it was no longer an individual who dies, but a specimen—this is a 
fact bound to affect the dying of those who escaped the administra-
tive measure. Genocide is absolute integration. It is on its way wher-
ever men are leveled off—“polished off,” as the German military 
called it—until one exterminates them literally, as deviations from 
the concept of their total nullity. Auschwitz confirmed the philoso-
pheme of pure identity as death (Adorno 1992, 362). 
 
If we take a close look at this quote, several aspects become clearer 
which show us why metaphysics is no longer an option in the face of the 
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Holocaust. First of all, every thought refuses to grant the mass murder a 
metaphysical sense. Secondly, the industrialized killing and dying de-
stroys one of the fundaments of traditional metaphysics, the retrospec-
tive dependence of metaphysical speculation on the experience of the 
single person that was established by the personal fear of one’s own 
death. Death now faces the individual in a mechanized form and proves 
the nullity of the individual: the nullity of its existence at all, the nullity 
of its own individuality. This becomes clear when the individual, as a 
mere copy of a type or race, i.e. a general disposition, suffers the same 
automated death with several other individuals. Thirdly, there is, in 
Adorno’s opinion, an even deeper structure that causes the failure or 
“fall” of metaphysics. This is, again, due to the fact that Auschwitz is not 
only a failure of a particular form of metaphysically impregnated philos-
ophizing, but also a failure of culture, to which this metaphysical philos-
ophy belongs as a part and an expression of itself. Therefore “[a]ll post-
Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage” (Adorno 
1992, 367). This diagnosis by Adorno, namely that metaphysics should 
not just be regarded as a superfluous counter model to, but rather as the 
very expression of a failed culture itself, profoundly subverts Rorty’s op-
position of metaphysical speculation (at least for morality), on the one 
hand, and seemingly the healthy, life-world rooted reality of actions on 
the other. “That this could happen in the midst of traditions of philoso-
phy, of art, and of the enlightening sciences says more than that these 
traditions and their spirit lacked the power to take hold of men and work 
a change in them. There is untruth in those fields themselves, in the au-
tarky that is emphatically claimed for them” (Adorno 1992, 366-7). That 
means that the dreadful kind of thought that finds its manifestation in 
the concentration camps is also at work in philosophy and science in a 
clandestine way. This thought even functions as a basis for the highest 
forms of culture – such as philosophy, art, and science – and it essential-
ly neglects the special and singular features of the particular being in fa-
vor of the identical aspects this being has in common with other things. 
It is this tendency to neglect and to level what is special and non-
identical which is essential to theoretical and metaphysical thought and 
which becomes reality in the fascist genocide. Thus it becomes clear, 
that for Adorno, metaphysics (which is deeply based on the deluded 
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principle of identification and the conceited preponderance of the uni-
versal), cannot present a remedy for a horrid reality that is constituted by 
the same principles and of which it is a part. 
Now, one might be inclined to turn Adorno’s considerations in a way 
that might lead one to admit that the Holocaust was just one break-
through of barbarism with roots specifically in Western European cul-
ture and its cultural forms. One then could call for a different way of 
thinking that takes the non-identical more strongly into account and for 
a philosophy that also gives us the consolation that thought will develop 
in such a way that we will never let Auschwitz happen again. By this 
Auschwitz would somehow get a meaning, namely just that we would 
have now been placed in a position, once and for all, to learn from our 
mistakes and to change our thinking and living. Furthermore, one could 
think that it is exactly Rorty’s undogmatic approach that answers to the 
non-pragmatic but metaphysical based Western European thought that 
lead to Auschwitz.  
That this is no option for Adorno has been made clear before. But 
why this is so becomes clearer whilst understanding how far reaching 
Adorno’s diagnosis is. First of all, Adorno would disagree with the thesis 
that the barbaric logic of identification, that is the very texture of Ausch-
witz, is just a past Western European phenomenon that could be elimi-
nated by decision. The reason for this gives a second point, which is that 
none of the forms of high culture (philosophy, art, science) are autono-
mous regions, which only accidentally come into contact with society. 
On the contrary: All three of them are essentially connected with society, 
which enforces its fixed constants and structures of thought upon them. 
Thirdly: The very essence of this kind of thought, which is substantiated 
as society and the forms of life imposed by it, consist in identifying and 
making the unequal equal. In Adorno’s eyes, this is true not only for 
Western European culture but also for North American capitalism – in 
which Adorno sees as nothing else but the totalitarian completion of 
Western European culture. Thus, Adorno’s diagnosis which concerns 
European culture also concerns North American capitalism; both are 
deeply rooted within the logics of identification. 
Auschwitz, thus, is not a break-in of barbarism into the enlightened 
capitalist society, but the realization of its very structure. This is the rea-
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son why the end of the concentration camps is not the end of the spell of 
identification. It rather subsists within capitalist societies and takes over 
all spheres of life. That is why “there is nothing innocuous left” (Adorno 
2005, 25). The seemingly innocent affable small talk is doomed by the 
spell of identification and implicitly sanctifies the existing order. “Even 
the blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen without the shad-
ow of terror” (Adorno 2005, 25). Every human and interpersonal relation 
is determined by this leveling, identifying, that is thought and form of 
existence and life at the same time. This has severe consequences for 
Rorty’s position. The selfsame living environment that according to Ror-
ty serves as a corrective against metaphysical ideas, which are out of 
touch with the real world, is, according to Adorno, nothing else but a 
monstrous structure of repression itself. 
Things get even worse for Rorty’s concept. The spell of identification, 
that haunts society, tends to conceal itself. It is a universal context of de-
ception and a ban that does not release its subjects but deludes them by 
making them think of themselves as free persons whilst they are ruled 
and compelled. This context of deception affects all regions of culture and 
thus also philosophy. For example: a philosophy that promotes the liberal-
istic conception of a human society promotes a society constituted by au-
tonomous selves, who use instrumental rationality to pursue their own 
interests and to maximize utility. In Adorno’s eyes, such a philosophy in-
deed is a mere reproduction of the solipsist way of existence which is im-
posed upon people by a repressive society in order to make them subjects 
of control using the delusion of freedom of choice (an argument that, 
again, Nietzsche already developed). Thus, this philosophy sanctions, as a 
theory, the selfsame structures of power that make the people submissive 
to the mechanisms of capitalist society. From this perspective, Rorty’s the-
ory does not appear to be an enlightened position which restores the im-
mediate ethical substance of everyday life but an unconscious affirmation 
of the machinery of power. 
Although thinking and philosophy are enmeshed within the spell of 
identification and power, and unable to get out of it, Adorno does not vote 
for a retreat from culture, thought, and philosophy for a return to rural 
life. This retreat again would simply sanction the power of society and its 
immanent logics that would finally creep up again upon the retreater. Ra-
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ther, we must think in a way that keeps the basic structure of identifica-
tion – that rules every thought – conscious, in order to overcome its own 
barbaric tendency to level the non-identical and, in particular, in this self-
reflexive manner. In other words: It is selfsame thinking that is cause and 
cure of the problems at the same time by thinking “against itself” and its 
brutal tendency of identification. The utopian aim of such thinking is to 
unlock the non-identical and release it from its forced deformations, to let 
it show itself and to give it a language of expression without imposing lev-
eling and identifying categories upon it. Such thinking would then not 
come to postulate some positive contents as examples of “the non-
identical,” but would consist in a constant negative dialectical criticism, 
which, in its process, would try to retrieve the non-identical out of the con-
text of deception. This is the reason why such a negative dialectics is able 
to offer a certain potential consolation without being urged to name and 
strictly determine the consoling utopia; even less it is forced to evoke a be-
lief in transcendental eternal values in order to find some “metaphysical 
comfort” against which Rorty so eloquently polemicizes. At the end stands 
a comfort that is only negative; it consists “in the gaze falling on horror, 
withstanding it, and in unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding 
fast to the possibility of what is better.” (Adorno 2005, 25) In this figure of 
negative dialectical thought Adorno is able to find his own idea of solidari-
ty, which is, as quoted above, solidarity with metaphysics “at the time of its 
fall.” 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that Adorno’s approach goes far beyond the bound-
aries of Rorty’s criticism without restoring a simple naive moral realism 
of a metaphysical kind. However, does this mean that we finally have to 
dismiss moral realism altogether? This does not seem necessary. At sec-
ond sight one could indeed see a certain kind of “moral realism” in 
Adorno’s philosophy. This, however, is not the moral realism Rorty at-
tacks. It rather is a moral realism that recurs on something “real,” i.e. 
the non-identical that serves as the measure of a thinking, that tries to 
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break the ban of identification without being so naive to think that the 
mere intention is the deed.  
This realism would be a moral one insofar as the negative dialectical 
movement of thought follows the intention to let the non-identical to be 
free in its otherness and dissolve it from its forced transformations. This 
is not realism because it claims the existence of eternal values; it is real-
ism because it aims at a change of reality; it is realism because the non-
identical is “real” as much as it can be freed from the spell of identifica-
tion by negative dialectical thinking. 
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